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Mull: The Pitfalls of the Microfinance Promise

INTRODUCTION
The modern world suffers from a poverty epidemic. One proposed
solution to this problem is microcredit, or microfinance, the concept of giving
small loans to those who do not have access to the traditional banking institutions
because they lack collateral, a steady job, or a credit history. The idea is that the
loan will be repaid through profits gained from entrepreneurial endeavors of the
debtor. Modern microfinance institutions (MFIs) come in many forms: NGOs,
commercial banks, private banks, and financial institutions. Generally, these
institutions choose to offer loans to groups within a community in order to create
social collateral and hold all loan holders in a group responsible for one another
(Fishman, 2012).
Microfinance is often advocated as the tool that will eradicate poverty in
the twenty-first century, and its elevated portrayal may lead some to the
conclusion that microcredit is the one-stop shop in the future of volunteerism and
aid. However, upon serious consideration, it is apparent that the industry has
many weaknesses that are not indicative of moral or effective practices. The
validity of microfinance institutions as poverty alleviation instruments is drawn
into question by the structure and practices of the industry, which hinder the
efficiency and depth of aid. This paper aims to outline the history and popularity
of microfinance, followed by the difficulties of its implementation. Then, it will
explain the scope of research in the field, microcredit’s role in the empowerment
of women, and the perception of microfinance in the West. Finally, it will discuss
the monumental ideological shifts within the industry and their consequential
negative effects on the field.
HISTORY AND POPULARITY
According to the United Nations estimates of world poverty, in 2012, 896
million people lived on less than $1.90 a day. At higher poverty lines, 2.2 billion
people lived on less than $3.10 a day in 2011 (United Nations, 2004).
Microfinance is often championed as the means to eliminate global poverty and
has gained immense attention and popularity in recent decades as a cure-all
poverty reduction tool. The United Nations even projected 2005 to be the
international year of microcredit (United Nations, 2004). Additionally, in 2006,
Muhammad Yunis and the Grameen Bank were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize
for “their efforts to create economic and social development from below"(The
Nobel Peace Prize 2006, 2014). Subsequently, nations and organizations poured
funding into the establishment of microfinance. For instance, in Bangladesh,
microfinance exploded as a poverty reduction tactic, yet, despite this dramatic
increase in funding, there has been little change in the poverty levels of the region

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2016

1

Global Tides, Vol. 10 [2016], Art. 9

(Ali, 2014). Thus, after more than two decades, questions of the effectiveness of
microfinance begin to arise.
Historically, the roots of microfinance were in informal banking.
However, in the 1970’s, the establishment of the Grameen bank pushed
microfinance into the global eye (Fishman, 2012). In India, microfinance began in
as a public initiative called the Initiated Rural Development Program (IRDP) to
reach rural households and provide reasonable aid with hopes that it could prove
sustainable, although the IRDP was eventually deemed incredibly corrupt. It was
reformed in the 1990’s with the onset of neoliberal shifts through which
microfinance was presented as a tool to facilitate capitalism (Taylor, 2011). The
establishment of modern microfinance can be traced to Dr. Muhammad Yunus
who drew attention to the idea that a lack of access to credit was a main cause of
poverty. He consequently established the Grameen Bank in India, which quickly
received international praise as a revolutionary means of poverty alleviation (Ali,
2014) and the expansion of microfinance has been substantial in the past two
decades. With this enlargement, and a shift in the Indian political sphere toward
liberalization, microfinance produced a private sector strain of institutions
(MFI’s) which function as for-profit establishments financed by commercial
banks and investors (Taylor, 2011). These institutions often operate in selfinterest and have changed the nature of the field significantly. MFIs are separate
institutions from standard banks because of high transaction costs, difficulty of
obtaining collateral, and short loan duration (Ambrish, 2014). The substantial
investment in the field reflects the unusual consensus of confidence regarding the
microfinance system.
THE REALITY OF THE FIELD
However, there are multiple fundamental issues with the institution of
microfinance and the effectiveness of its implementation because of lack of
consideration for the market. For instance, Megan Moodie, a professor at UC
Santa Cruz, suggests that microfinance operations may amplify the existing
vulnerabilities of the clients they aim to help (Moodie, 2013). An institution that
ignores the glaring limits of the markets in the rural communities it attempts to
reach is engaging in unproductive and wishful thinking, and ironically, the
dialogue surrounding microfinance is in terms of the risk and benefit of the lender
instead of the borrower (Moodie, 2013). The fact remains that just because a man
has the means and tools to start a business, he will not necessarily be met with
sufficient demand for his products. Similarly, while there is potential that the
increase in vendors of certain markets through microfinance may aid some sellers,
it may also displace other individuals already in the market. As a result, it would
merely redistribute poverty rather than make any concrete improvements. In such
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a case, there is risk that microfinance is a solution which creates a fixed pie
resolution to poverty (Khan 2009). A zero sum approach however, requires a
market for funded goods. Equally as concerning is the fact that most microcredit
funding goes toward entrepreneurial endeavors when the glaring reality is that not
every person is, or has the skills to be, an entrepreneur.
Another main concern of the practice of microfinance it is essentially
impossible to ensure that microloans are allocated toward so called “sustainable
expenditures.” Many individuals choose to use their loans simply for consumption
spending which is neither productive nor sustainable (Khan, 2009). In fact, many
use the microloan as provisions for non-income producing items and income
shocks such as repaying debts, planning weddings, or rebuilding a home
(Roodman, 2012). Similarly, there are challenges to holding the assets, such as
livestock or farming materials, which microloans could traditionally fund. For
instance, livestock may require veterinary care or a farmer may not be prepared
for a year of drought. Essentially, due to a lack of savings, the borrower has no
capacity to handle income shocks (Fishman, 2012). In total, the reality of
assuming that each loan contributes to establishing a successful small business
venture is unrealistic and misguided.
Partially because of an increased focus on sustainability figures, there is a
concerning lack of research on the effects of microfinance. Currently, there is
simply insufficient evidence to claim that microfinance is an effective tool to
those truly in poverty (Khan, 2009). As of 2009, research shows mixed results,
which do little to justify the incredible amount of funding poured into the
microfinance industry annually (Khan, 2009). Although there are millions of
dollars donated toward fighting poverty every year, very little energy is allocated
toward evaluating what kind of aid is most necessary and effective (Roodman,
2012). The fact is that the effects of microcredit can be as varied as the clients
who take out loans (Roodman, 2012). Thus, it is invalid to claim microfinance as
the catch-all poverty reduction tactic as it is often presented.
This ambiguity is exemplified in the divide which exists in the debate
regarding microfinance subsidization. The proponents of subsidization argue that
on one hand, were microfinance truly the ultimate tool to fight poverty, then even
the poorest should have access to it. If interest rates do not cover the increased
costs of reaching that demographic then donors should make up the difference
(Roodman, 2012). However, opponents argue for the importance of the industry’s
self-sustainability. A second disconnect lies in defining the source of poverty and
how it will be cured. Dr. Yunus originally attributed poverty to institutional flaws,
maintaining that the poor have skills which are undiscovered and unutilized. The
fault that some may find in this theory is that it does not recognize or account for
the range of capabilities of the impoverished. Simply providing someone the tools
to create a product does little to guarantee that there will be a market for the
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merchandise, and this assumption may even displace individuals already present
as sellers in a specific market with finite demands (Khan, 2009).
WOMEN AND MICROFINANCE
One of the greatest accolades of microfinance is its potential to empower
women in rural communities who are traditionally underprivileged in the
household or society. Again, the results are overwhelmingly mixed. At its best,
microfinance has the potential to provide women the tools to be self-sufficient
actors in communities where they could not have been before (Moodie 2013).
However, it would seem that this hope is often unrealistic. Initially, in addition to
the social benefits, women were the target group of MFIs because of their
perceived reliability as clients. As MFIs grew, they used intermediaries such as
NGOs to lower transaction costs. These loans primarily went to groups of women
which, in the minds of NGOs, were being empowered and represented through the
process of becoming financially literate. However, in the perspective of policy
makers, these processes served as self-selection to reduce costs and probability of
default. It was a tool in moving toward the goal of self-sustaining microfinance
institutions and a process geared toward effectiveness, not merit of aid (Taylor,
2011).
Unfortunately, this process often gives primarily male loan officers power
over the primarily female borrowing population (Roodman, 2012). Additionally,
microfinance has not been demonstrated to alleviate the strain of basic human
needs such as food or shelter. Specifically, for women, this peril holds serious
weight as microfinance has been presented as a means for women’s
empowerment. In the most cynical view, there is even evidence to suggest that
there is an increased likelihood that these women become victims of household
violence as amplified stress and anxiety surrounding debt magnify tensions and
create new forms of social dominance (Moodie, 2013). In addition, although
women take out loans, it is often men who actually go on to use the money. This
peril arises for women because of the borrowing as well as the requirements
which they submit to when agreeing to a loan which places them in a position of
weakness (Moodie, 2013). Unfortunately, the industry is not the safe-haven it is
often perceived to be for women.
THE PERCEPTIVE OF THE WEST
One of the greatest testaments of the Western world’s misunderstanding of
microfinance is the popularity and processes of Kiva.org. Kiva, a website
dedicated to collecting donations and giving it to MFIs, has become enormously
popular through its peer-to-peer approach. By providing potential lenders with
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photos and descriptions of “entrepreneurs,” Kiva creates a sentiment of personal
connection to the borrowers (Moodie, 2013). Much of the draw of microfinance,
specifically in the personal method presented by Kiva, is that the lender would be
“helping a person help themselves.” In reality, however, Kiva has no follow up
process for what happens once a lender’s money is delivered to an MFI. Kiva’s
simple portrayal of microfinance is not an accurate representation of the
complicated process through which money is filtered. The money goes through
Kiva and a microfinance institution before being delivered to a lender similar to
the one pictured. The money then may or may not be used for an entrepreneurial
enterprise because often, borrowers tell lenders what they want to hear out of
simple self-interest. A study of a group of women receiving microloans in
Bangladesh revealed that a marginal minority of the women were using the loans
for their intended purposes (Roodman, 2012). Kiva’s intention, however, is only
to provide funding to the MFIs, who they deem to be the true experts, and hold
that their MFI partners in the field should not be micromanaged or supervised by
Kiva (Moodie, 2013). The result, however, is that after the funding, Kiva holds no
accountability for the people served by the MFIs (Moodie, 2013). The focus is on
the loan and the risk of the lender rather than that of the borrower, and the
borrowers’ needs are rarely discussed as part of this risk (Moodie, 2013). Kiva
plays to the West’s lingering paternalistic approach to aid and intentionally
ignores the weaknesses of the industry.
CHANGES IN THE INDUSTRY AND THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABILITY
A neoliberal perspective of poverty states that the poor are capable of
achieving financial independence if they are part of the free market. Currently,
most microfinance institutions work from a neoliberal premise. This neoliberal
idea of poverty thus suggests that when the poor fail to lift themselves from
poverty, the blame is placed on the victims, which then legitimizes the coercive
tactics of recovery used by lenders (Ali, 2014).The vast majority of microfinance
institutions work within neoliberal terms, which essentially frees them from the
concern of poverty reduction.
Additionally, the microfinance industry’s affiliation with Wall Street is a
new wave of microfinance that focuses on its financial sustainability rather than
the decline of poverty. The result is an increased pairing of banks with
microfinance institutions (Moodie, 2013). The reality is that with this change, the
institution becomes a business rather than an institution whose goal is to lift
people from poverty. While ideally, both models may be possible simultaneously,
under these practices, the microfinance industry shows the damaging effects of
profit concerns in the field of aid.
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The criticisms of microfinance are often credited to the shift of the
institution from service to profit. In recent years, organizations have made the
effort to minimize reliance on grants and adhere to a policy of loan repayment
which requires interest (Khan, 2009). Many institutions have a “double bottom
line” referring to their goal for financial sustainability paired with maintaining
some level of service. However, in order to provide small loans to rural areas and
feasibly still cover costs, interest rates usually must be high (Khan, 2009).
Additionally, this change often affects the mindset of fieldworkers. They may be
more inclined to provide loans to an individual who cannot pay them off in the
name of financial gain (Khan, 2009). This shift was deemed necessary by the idea
that a profit driven model of microfinance allows for greater penetration of the
market of poor individuals (Taylor, 2011). The divide lies in the fact that
microfinance analysis follows two approaches: the “welfarist” and the
“institutionalist.” The welfarists’ focus lies in providing fiscal services rather than
financial sustainability (Adhikary & Papachristou, 2014). Contrastingly,
institutionalists value sound financial organization and tend to provide services to
more clients, but at a decreased depth of the services. Generally, this focus on
quantity usually serves better-off clients, overlooking small recipients with small
loans and undermining the commonly argued strengths of these policies that “the
commercial viability of MFIs increases with the number of borrowers” (Adhikary
& Papachristou, 2014). Furthermore, this pressure of sustainability may take away
from monitoring of client impact in favor of lender impact (Khan 2009).
The consequences of the shift to a for-profit model in microfinance are
substantial as the focus, goals, and results of the industry shift as well. One of the
biggest and most widely criticized changes is the increase in interest rates. As
institutions move toward a goal of sustainability, and even profit, the natural
result is an increase in interest rates. In order to cover the costs of providing
financial services in rural areas, these interest rates are considerably higher than
what Western borrowers would find reasonable. This increase is not inherently
unfair; however, many institutions have increased their interest rates further with
the intention of maximizing profits. With interest rates ranging from 30 to 60
percent and being implemented in multiple forms, it is difficult for rural
borrowers to protect themselves from falling into an inescapable cycle of debt.
Furthermore, loan providers are aware that many of the borrowers are
financially illiterate. Often, borrowers demand no explanation of the terms of a
loan before agreeing. This opens a door to exploitation in an industry in which the
original intention was aid. For example, implemented widely, a deceptive flat
interest rate effectively doubles the interest on the loan by requiring interest in the
full loan amount even as the owed amount declines after payments (Roodman,
2012). Thus, without transparent prices, borrowers are deprived of the opportunity
to compare policies. In some cases, interest rates even increase as loan amount
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decreases in order to maintain profits (Ambrish, 2014). Such practices are an
obvious departure from an attitude which had upheld microfinance as an arm of
international aid similar to donation. Mahammad Yunus (2011), one of the
pioneers of microfinance himself, openly condemned this change in a New York
Times article:
In the 1970s, when I began working here on what would eventually be
called “microcredit,” one of my goals was to eliminate the presence of
loan sharks who grow rich by preying on the poor. In 1983, I founded
Grameen Bank to provide small loans that people, especially poor women,
could use to bring themselves out of poverty. At that time, I never
imagined that one day microcredit would give rise to its own breed of loan
sharks. Commercialization has been a terrible wrong turn for
microfinance, and it indicates a worrying “mission drift” in the motivation
of those lending to the poor. Poverty should be eradicated, not seen as a
money-making opportunity.
Such explicit criticism from one of the founders of modern microfinance speaks
as a testament to the problems within the industry. Critics argue, however, that
Grameen bank is in the unique position of being an attraction to donors because of
its history and name recognition, which other institutions simply do not have
(Roodman, 2012).
Another weakness of microfinance’s shift to profit is the widespread use
of loan recovery rates as indicators of success. The microfinance industry often
measures success in the ability of borrowers to repay loans on time, yet there
seems to be little correlation between actual economic empowerment and higher
loan repayment(Ali, 2014). Nonetheless, microfinance institutions tout their high
recovery rates (Ali, 2014). Thus, the measure of repayment which is used so often
as a testament to the strength of the microfinance practice is not concretely
connected to escape from poverty. Essentially, the financial practices of MFI’s
range from reasonable to unjust and accurate to delusional.
As institutions look to maximize profits and please investors, a main
criticism is that they intentionally forgo providing loans to the poorest members
of the population because they are typically less profitable. By attempting to
reduce costs by “clustering,” institutions leave some parts of the market
oversaturated and others in need. The initial costs of going to remote locations
discourage MFIs from establishing there (Ambrish, 2014). Many institutions’
hesitance to provide loans to individuals without an existing source of income
excludes the poorest sector of the population. There is also evidence that some of
the poorer clients who are offered loans choose not to take them out of fear that
they will not be able to repay them (Khan, 2009). This clear limit of the industry
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is born out of focus on profit. The purpose of microfinance institutions is
bypassed by measuring success through earnings.
LENDING PRACTICES
With the shift toward sustainable microfinance practices, a great increase
in breadth of provided loans increases profits of MFIs. However, it is not
necessarily accompanied by assurance that a borrower has the capacity to repay a
loan. Thus, there is accusation of aggressive lending practices being implemented
on the part of microfinance institutions. A main concern is the willingness to lend
to the financially illiterate, and the lack of accountability to create fair practices in
such a case. Many individuals take out loans knowing only how to sign their
names and having no real idea what the parameters and possible repercussions of
the agreement are (Ambrish, 2014). Microfinance NGO’s earn profit from hidden
fees, service charges, unregulated interest rates, and obligatory savings (Ali,
2014). For example, in Bangladesh, it is a known practice to give intentionally
vague or complicated parameters to a loan, or even provide unwritten contracts
(Roodman, 2012). Often, repayment begins almost immediately after a loan is
given, which is not a realistic time frame to build business or reap profits (Khan,
2009). An explanation of the continued of compliance of the impoverished is
financial illiteracy: essentially, a debt trap (Taylor, 2011). This phenomenon also
often results in multiple institutions lending to the same borrowers (Fishman,
2012). Cross borrowing, or multiple borrowing, demonstrates the ineffectiveness
of such practices. It is clear however, that the practice is common and widespread
in regions with multiple MFIs. As a result, such practices create the idea of debt
as a social norm, which perpetuates uninformed and ill-advised borrowing
(Roodman, 2012).
After these loans have been outlined and implemented, the debate then
turns to the means by which loans are recovered. Loans are often issued according
to the concept of group lending. Members of a community must choose to be tied
to one another in their loans and, if one member defaults, the other members will
be held responsible. The result is immense social pressure. In some cases, this
practice increases effectiveness and accountability. However, it also provides
opportunity for the exploitation of these groups by MFIs or for the group
members to act out against one another if a member defaults. This problem of
exploitation is compounded by the fact that currently, there is little regulation
across the MFI field (Ambrish, 2014). As such, the recovery process can become
entrenched in violence and exploitation. For example, NGO’s in Bangladesh
perpetuate violence through the creation of imbalanced power structures,
institutional practices, and unequal opportunities, and can come in the form of
direct as well as structural violence. Examples of this aggression include creating
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unequal power relations in the community, manipulation of groups of women to
oppress their peers, and shaming (Ali, 2014). In addition, within groups and at the
hands of microfinance institutions, the poorest clients are often bypassed in loan
consideration because they are not believed to be able to repay (Ali, 2014).
In the most extremes cases, there have been serious accusations of the
immoral and aggressive acts of microfinance institutions leading individuals to
commit suicide. In 2010, in the Indian state Andhra Pradesh, the suicides of
multiples impoverished borrowers, who faced incredible debt and underwent
hostile tactics of collection, drew negative attention to the MFI’s and resulted in
widespread loan defaults (Taylor, 2011). The concentration of MFIs in Andhra
Pradesh was caused by the neoliberal reforms pursued by the state government
and the promotion of microfinance as a means of aiding the community (Taylor,
2011). MFI’s soon began to seek external shareholders, which consequently
marginalized the borrowers’ role in the system as institutions looked to build their
base and expand monetary gain (Taylor, 2011). In many cases, the groups began
lending to individuals who already had financing from another institution (Taylor,
2011). This market oversaturation resulted in a bubble in Indian microfinance.
Many households took out multiple loans, paying off one with another and
numerous suicides were then linked to the questionable tactics of collection
agents (Taylor, 2011). As a result, more than 80 people committed suicide in the
region after defaulting on microloans. The shame facilitated by group lending in
many of these cultures for loan defaults suggests that suicide is not at all of
unheard of or uncommon. There is even fear that the collapse of repayment in
Andhra Pradesh could spread to similarly glutted regions of the microfinance
industry if recovery practices remain the same (Fishman, 2012). This crisis
brought skepticism of microfinance to the forefront of governmental and public
attention. The financial commitments of large world governments and upswing in
private investment to microfinance were subsequently questioned (Taylor, 2011).
CONCLUSION
As a practice, microcredit is meant to harness the resources of capitalism
and allocate them among the poor and impoverished. Founded primarily in South
Asia, it’s an inspiring idea that a person could be lifted from poverty with only a
small loan. Upon closer inspection, however, research reveals flaws with the
practicality of microfinance as an industry and even just as a practice. The
primary assumption of the field that every person can be an entrepreneur
regardless of background, market limitations, or intelligence has been
demonstrated to be problematic. Similarly, the reality of these loans is that they
are often used for purposes other than the entrepreneurial pitch for which they
were attained. Statistical and social evidence gives at best mixed results in favor

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2016

9

Global Tides, Vol. 10 [2016], Art. 9

of the microfinance as an all-purpose poverty reduction method. The infatuation
of Western cultures with the solution of microfinance is understandable given the
incredible ambiguity with which most institutions discuss the practice. People
become enamored with the idea of helping the women whose photo they’ve
connected to via screen. In reality, their money is being filtered through a
bureaucracy to a person who may or may not bear resemblance to the woman
pictured. Essentially, recognizing the industry for what it is, rather than what
people hope it to be, can be a daunting task.
Another realization made apparent in the research was the real effect of
the liberalization of microfinance and the subsequent shift toward a goal of
sustainability and profitability. This shift changes the very foundation of the
industry, the effects of microcredit services foundationally, and has not been
properly recognized as a destructive influence in the industry. Microfinance’s
potential for good has resulted in unquestioned positivity toward it as an idea,
regardless of the uncertainty of its benefits in the target communities. In
approaching the subject of microfinance, it is important to evaluate its actual role
in the service industry. Historically founded from criticism of the practices of loan
sharks, microfinance has nonetheless succumbed to similar deviations in its
mission.
The microfinance industry has great potential as a means for providing
financial services to those who are traditionally excluded by the market. However,
the impression most of the world has on the current effects of such practices is
misled. On an individual basis, there is much potential for microloans to create a
solution to poverty via self-help. However, as an actual practice and field of
poverty reduction, there are glaring problems in the implementation of
microfinance in a safe, effective, and realistic way. These problems are
compounded by the industry’s current focus on profit and sustainability, which
further distract from the original focus of poverty alleviation. Further, the
industry, and its research, is often self-serving and focused on loan recovery.
Microfinance, although born out of honorable intentions, often creates a culture of
exploitation between the lender borrower relationships. It appears that there will
have to be widespread reform of the industry before the practice could ever be
condoned as a whole. There is indeed potential for microfinance to be an effective
tool in the world of poverty reduction as are clearly cases of people being aided in
a positive way through microloans. However, the existing flaws lead to the belief
that microfinance should be removed from rhetoric of perfect poverty eradication
tool and demoted to one tactic of poverty alleviation among many.
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